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ACCUTANE WARNINGS (from page 105)
At the time Felix ingested Accutane, these
warnings were accurate. Documented cases of
Accutane-related teratogenicity in human fe-
tuses and offspring appeared only after Felix had
ingested Accutane. The language used in the
warnings thus contained no misrepresentations
that would mislead a physician prescribing the
drug. For these reasons, the Supreme Court held
the warnings were comprehensive, clear, and
accurate. Thus, the court affirmed the judge-
ment of the appellate court.
Warnings Not Proximate Cause of Infant's Death
The supreme court similarly adopted the rea-
soning of the appellate court that, although
Greenwald's alleged failure to share his knowl-
edge of the dangers of Accutane with Felix
might be important in a claim against the doctor
himself, such was irrelevant in a liability action
against the manufacturer Hoffmann-LaRoche.
Both courts observed that the manufacturer
could not be held liable for a doctor's failure to
impart knowledge to a patient.
The supreme court concluded that the death
of Felix's child could not be attributed to an
inadequacy in the warnings because the warn-
ings were adequate at the time Greenwald pre-
scribed the drug to Felix. Moreover, Hoffmann-
LaRoche had only the duty to warn the prescrib-
ing physician of the drug's dangers unless the
FDA stipulated otherwise. Because Hoffmann-
LaRoche had fulfilled its duty, it could not be
held liable.
Elizabeth A. Mitchell
1. Accutane, derived from Vitamin A, falls within a class of drugs
known as retinoids. Since 1954, retinoids have been known to
cause birth defects in children whose mothers ingested them in
large doses during pregnancy. Patients taking Accutane suffer
side effects which include loss of vision, severe depression, gas-
trointestinal and cardiac problems, and central nervous system
disorders. See Nygaard, Accutane: Is the Drug a Prescription for
Birth Defects?, 24 TRIAL 81 (1988).
2. Teratogenicity is defined as the ability to create a deformed,
abnormal being. Accutane's teratogenicity was first noted by Dr.
Wener Bollag of Hoffmann-LaRoche's parent company. Bollag
compared Accutane's effects to those of thalidomide, the highly-
publicized tranquilizer that was withdrawn from the market in
the 1960s because it caused severe limb deformities in the child-
ren of mothers who had used the drug. Id.
IOWA SUPREME COURT HOLDS
INSURANCE COVERAGE IS
UNAVAILABLE IF UNIDENTIFIED
HIT AND RUN DRIVER
DOES NOT PHYSICALLY
CONTACT VICTIM
In Moritz v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 434
N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1989), the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled that the "uninsured motorist" clause
of an automobile insurance policy does not
apply when there is no physical contact between
the insured car and a vehicle which is claimed to
have caused the accident. Reasoning that insur-
ance companies must be protected from fraud-
ulent claims, the court held that the companies
need not provide coverage when there is no
physical contact between the insured car and
the unidentified vehicle. In addition, the court
held that the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions, which requires that insurance policies be
construed as the insured layperson would con-
strue them, was properly considered and re-
jected by the lower court. Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiff's claims that Iowa's unin-
sured motorist statute, Iowa Code Ann. 516A.1-
516A.4 (West 1988) ("the Act"), violates the equal
protection clauses of the Iowa and the United
States Constitutions.
Background
In September, 1986, Michaela Moritz (Moritz)
was a passenger in a car that was forced off the
road by an unidentified driver of another vehi-
cle. The car ran into a tree and Moritz was
injured. Moritz brought suit against the Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual
Insurance"), the insurer of the car in which she
was riding, to recover for her injuries under the
policy's "uninsured motorist" clause. Two counts
of her complaint alleged that Mutual Insurance
was liable for Moritz' injuries caused by the un-
identified driver of the other vehicle. In its
motion for summary judgment, Mutual Insur-
ance maintained that collisions caused by un-
identified motorists were covered only when
there was physical contact between the un-
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known car and the insured vehicle. The trial
court determined that a prerequisite to cover-
age under the policy is that there be contact
between the vehicles in question. Because there
was no contact between the vehicles in this case,
the court granted the motion for summary
judgement in favor of Mutual Insurance.
Iowa statutorily provides uninsured motorist
coverage to victims of hit-and-run accidents for
injuries "arising out of physical contact... with a
motor vehicle which the [insured] is occupying
at the time of the accident." Iowa Code Ann.
§ 516A.1 (West 1988) (emphasis added). On ap-
peal to the Iowa Supreme Court, Moritz con-
tended that the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions should be applied to extend coverage to
victims of accidents when there is no contact
between the vehicles. Moritz, however, did not
produce any evidence to support her argument
that the doctrine of reasonable expectations
should apply, other than a general claim that a
policy purchaser might have expected coverage
under similar circumstances. In addition, Moritz
asserted that the Act violates the equal protec-
tion clauses of the Iowa and United States
Constitutions.
No Coverage Under Case Law or Express
Language of Policy
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the order
of the trial court. The court first addressed
Moritz' assertion that her injuries should be
covered under the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations, as adopted by the Iowa Supreme
Court in Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973). The doctrine of
reasonable expectations protects the insured
layperson by providing that policies will be
interpreted from the perspective of the average
insurance policyholder rather than that of the
insurance underwriter. The doctrine usually
comes into play if a policy's exclusion is bizarre
or oppressive, if a policy eviscerates terms ex-
plicitly agreed to, or if a policy eliminates the
dominant purpose of the transaction.
The court next noted that in Rohret v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa
1979), it had interpreted the Act to authorize
insurance companies to include a policy clause
which requires physical contact with the un-
identified vehicle. Furthermore, the terms of the
policy issued by Mutual Insurance required that
the unidentified car actually strike the insured
vehicle in order for it to qualify for coverage.
The policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle"
as "a 'hit-and-run' land motor vehicle whose
owner or driver remains unknown and which
strikes.. .the vehicle the insured is occupying
and causes bodily injury to the insured." 434
N.W. 2d at 625. In light of the Rohret decision
and the terms of the policy, the Iowa Supreme
Court declined to extend uninsured motorist
coverage to situations that involve no physical
contact between the vehicles.
No Equal Protection Violation
Next, the court examined Moritz' claim that
the Act violated her right to equal protection
under the federal and state constitutions. She
argued that the physical contact requirement of
the Act unfairly deprived a class of policyholders
of their right to insurance coverage. In order to
sustain her claim, however, Moritz had the
burden of negating every reasonable basis for
upholding the denial of insurance coverage to
her class of policyholders. The court stated that
the Act's physical contact requirement was in-
tended to ensure that an accident had in fact
occurred, and accepted this reasoning as a valid
basis for excluding coverage to victims of acci-
dents when there is no physical contact between
the vehicles. The court also observed that the
California Supreme Court had rejected an equal
protection challenge to its uninsured motorist
statute for similar reasons.
In sum, the supreme court affirmed the dis-
missal of the claims relating to the unidentified
driver of the other vehicle, as well as the sum-
mary judgment in favor of Mutual Insurance.
The court declined to rule on two other counts
in Moritz' complaint because the lower court's
ruling had not addressed them.
Carole Crawford
